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Abstract 
High taxation is found to lead not to less labor supply but to more tax evasion and/or black labor. 
Investigating next what this implies for the course of the tax revenue and subsequently for the shape of 
the Laffer curve, this curve is found to change with the tax induced change of taxpayer preferences 
over tax compliance and tax aversion. Hence, the relevant Laffer curve when contemplating tax cuts 
should be the one after the last tax increase and cannot thereby be fully self-financed. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the latest addition to the literature advocating an upward sloping Laffer curve all the way up to 
the tax rate of 100% is Usher’s (2013) paper, in which tax evasion enters into the discussion indirectly 
as a source of bias when estimating the peak of this curve. This note, by introducing tax evasion into 
the original theoretical modeling of the “ever-increasing” Laffer curve by Malcomson (1986) and 
Denicolò (1988), presents a direct link between the two concepts. This is done in the first part of the 
next section, complementing thus Usher’s presentation of the matter. Yet, a full treatment of the subject 
should focus on the implied link between the Laffer curve and underground economy, too. This task is 
undertaken in the second part of the following section through a deterministic Lotka-Volterra system 
rather than via Busato and Chiarini’s (2012) dynamic general equilibrium approach. Tax revenue is 
found to be more sensitive to changes in tax aversion (tax evasion and/or tax-induced black labor) 
behavior relative to changes in tax aversion attitudes in response to tax cuts. Consequently, a 
disturbance of the steady state by tax authorities would incite increasing instability.  
Incentives matter and are found indeed to alter the way taxpayers assess the tax rate scale, making in 
turn the shape of the Laffer curve susceptible to the unit of measurement of the tax rate axis when the 
curve is drawn as a frequency plot. Section 3 concludes this paper stressing this nexus between Laffer 
curve and the incentives of the taxpayers beyond their resource constraints. It is this line of inquiry, 
having produced this paper and its main result crystallized in its title. The curve should be 
contemplated analytically and policy-wise under the dynamic-scoring mentality underlying the 
question: “by how much a tax cut is self-financing if we take incentive feedback effects into account” 
(Trabandt and Uhlig 2011, p.1) given that 32% of a labor tax cut in the US and 54% in EU-14 are self-
financing (Trabandt and Uhlig 2011, p.1). The answer to this question provided here within the 
particular theoretical context employed below is that only partly a tax cut can be self-financing. For 
example, it is noteworthy that increases in corporate tax rates are found empirically by Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky (2014) to lead to significant reductions in employment and income, with little evidence 
that corporate tax cuts boost economic activity in the official, of course, economy. 
2. Analysis 
2.1 The Standard Modeling Extended 
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According to Malcomson (1986), there are  identical individuals, each maximizing the Stone-Geary 
utility function: 
   	 
   	 
        1
 
subject to the constraint that:   1 	 
, where  and  are labor endowment and supply, 
respectively,  is “survival” consumption,  is consumption above ,  is the tax rate, and  is a 
constant. The resulting expression for  is: 
  1   

1  
1 	 
,        2
 
with    0⁄ ,  implying thereby the upward sloping Laffer curve:   
, up to the point 
  1, where it presents discontinuity. Denicolò (1988) interprets this discontinuity as a sudden fall in 
labor supply once individuals can no longer survive. Now, let the above constraint become:  
1 	 
  1 	 
    1 	 
, where  is the probability of the detection of tax evasion. 
(2) becomes: 
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with Laffer curve:   , 
.  According to (3), labor supply at    does not fall to zero and 
no discontinuity emerges at   1, simply because of the possibility of surviving through tax evasion. 
And, certainly, 
  , 
, because 
  , 
    1. Denicolò (1998) also 
points out that discontinuity cannot be given rise under (2) anyway, since setting a   1 in the 
constraint   1 	 
    1 	  ⁄ 
, one obtains that 0  	 ⁄ 
, which would hold only if 
  0. This appears to be the case in the presence of tax evasion as well; a     0 means that all 
chances to make ends meet have been exhausted. Actually, the optimization problem behind (2) is not 
well defined for   1 	  ⁄ 
 and the value   1 is thereby inadmissible. But, the tax rate may do 
take on such a value in connection with the problem behind (3), because the constraint  
1 	 
     	 
 ⁄ , and a   1 is possible when  ⁄  1 	 
 ⁄ . 
These results to hold need the changes in  to affect , and according to labor economics, little only 
appears to be the evidence supporting such a link (see e.g. Slemrod 2000). One reason for this 
conclusion is that the data used are after-tax-invasion data as follows: Let from (2) and (3) 
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, 
respectively. Their comparison amounts after some operations to the comparison of the terms: !1 	

1 	 
1 	 
 	 1
" and #!1 	 
$ 	 1 	 
$"%. The first in order term is clearly 
negative given that both  and  are both decimals. To see the sign of the second term suffices to 
compare 1 	 
 with 1 	 
 given that if the former exceeds the latter so will their cubes and much 
more so when 1 	 
$ is multiplied with the decimal . Indeed, 1 	   1 	     1, which is 
true. Therefore,   : High tax rates do not lead to less work but to shift income out of taxable 
form. Nowadays, the Laffer curve is considered to be empirically an illusionary concept, because it is 
detached from taxpayer-incentives considerations as they are prompted by the reality of tax evasion. If 
not anything else, a worker may be inquiring about a second, twilight job, and a businessman may be 
deliberating ways to go informal just when the government will be thinking that is improving social 
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welfare! Methodologically, this is one more example of the thesis that what matters cognitively, is the 
empirical implications of a theoretical construct and not the empirical content of the construct per se. In 
what follows, a formal modeling of these conclusions is attempted. 
2.2 A Generalized Laffer Curve 
Let the percentage of  having produced the unreported income and/or channeled underground be &, 
0  &  1, so that   &  1 	 &
. That is, unofficially, there is always full employment, and part 
of the income unreported to the tax authorities may be the result of tax evasion or underground 
activities or both. Let next ' and ( be the rates of change of )   ⁄  and   & &⁄ , respectively, 
given . The quantities  and & are the highest values  and & can reach. Let moreover * represent 
the harmful effect the growth of  has on ) and + represent the negative influence of a declining  and 
increasing 1 	 )
 on . These parameters need not be equal, only positive as follows: 
)
  ')!1 	 )  *
"      4
 

  (#1 	 !  +1 	 )
"%      5
 
These two differential equations form a competitive Lotka-Volterra system (Bomze 1995) where the 
quantities ) and  are bounded between 0 and 1 at all times. Equilibrium occurs in the model when 
neither of these quantities is changing, i.e. when both of the derivatives are equal to 0, which is the case 
when: 
)  *  1   and     +1 	 )
  1 
with unique solutions: 
.  11  *+    /  )̂ 
1 	 *1 	 +

1  *+  
That is, all depends on the values of the parameters * and +, with (i) )̂ being equal to .!1 	 *1 	 +
" 
and hence, with )̂ .⁄  1 	 *1 	 +
  0  1 	 +  1 *⁄ , and (ii) .  1 	 )̂
 *⁄  and hence, with 
. 1 	 )̂
⁄  1 *⁄ : Tax revenue is more sensitive to changes in tax evasion and/or black labor 
behavior relative to changes in tax evasion and/or black labor attitudes in response to tax cuts. 
Consequently, only partly such cuts can prove to be self-financing and a disturbance of the steady state 
by tax authorities would destabilize the economy permanently. Indeed, evaluating the Jacobian 1 at the 
steady state of ., )̂
 we get: 
12., )̂3  11  *+ 4
'!*2 	 +
 	 1" 	'*!1 	 *1 	 +
"
(+ (!*+1 	 +
 	 1  +
"5 
with a complicated cubic characteristic equation in +, which connotes increasing instability once 
equilibrium is disturbed, since no limit cycle can exist within the context of any two-dimensional 
model of this type (Hirsch 1990). Intuitively, those who give in to tax evasion and/or underground 
activities have been taking some pain before deciding to do so, and once they do, many of them distrust 
policy incentives to leave this “safety net” despite any risks of getting caught by the authorities. 
Taxpayer incentives before and after tax aversion are not the same. 
This is perhaps the reason the shape of the Laffer curve as a frequency plot in the  	 ) space depends 
on the unit of measurement of the -axis as in Figure 1 where 67 is the Laffer curve before tax aversion 
and 6  is one such curve after tax aversion. Within the context of 67, tax aversion appears to postpone 
the peak of the curve. But, in reality, tax aversion changes the unit of measurement of the -axis so as 
to be compatible with the incentives that induced aversion. People do not see the tax rates  
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Figure 1: Laffer curve as a frequency plot 
with the same eye as before tax aversion. Within the framework of 67, a tax cut from 80% to 65% is 
expected to yield the same tax revenue, but it actually yields the revenue corresponding to 60%, 
because simply the relevant Laffer curve is 6 . The difference in the measurement unit reflects the 
difference in incentives, and it is up to this unit if the curve exhibits a peak at all; 68  instead of 6  
might had been the case.  Moreover, it is for this reason that “an inverse relationship between tax rates 
and tax revenues may exist at low levels of the tax rate” (Waud 1985) as Figure 1 illustrates as well.  
3. Concluding Remarks 
What is for sure is that “in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation…the second-best frontier 
which incorporates incentive constraints… relates to the first-best frontier which takes only resource 
constraints into account…[and] the second-best frontier can be interpreted as a Laffer-curve” 
(Bierbrauer and Boyer 2010, p. 1). Incentives influence the shape of this curve, indeed, which is a 
hypothesis that should be documented empirically and investigated further through alternative 
theoretical constructs. And, to the extent things have more or less the way described herein, when tax 
cuts are contemplated the point of reference should not be the position on the pre-tax Laffer curve. The 
policymaker should also bear in mind that the same incentives, which herein contain the influence of 
tax cuts, have externalities: “tax evaders protect each other, because they tie down limited enforcement 
capacity. Thus… tax rate cuts…can lead to increased revenues through spillovers…imply[ing] 
increasing effective taxes” (Papp and Takáts 2008, p. 1).  
 
From the viewpoint of the habit-formation approach, the decision to engage in tax aversion might be 
taken to be the outcome of agents facing shocks to their abilities to generate labor income. Labor 
income is publicly observed, but abilities and labor supply are private information and since, habit 
formation connects present and future self-selection, the complementarity between habits and 
consumption, makes self-selection easier in the future if the worker consumes a lot in the present, 
engaging as a result in tax aversion, (Koehne and Kuhn 2015). This habit effect calls for subsidies to 
labor supply rather than for tax cuts. 
 
An exception to the persistence of the decision for tax aversion appears to the case according to which 
this decision is made aiming at earning the money needed to pay to the tax authority some fixed price 
for the reduction of the marginal tax rate; it is the case of the so called “tax buyouts”, (Goerke 2015). 
Also, judging from the work of Strulik (2010) about anticipated tax reforms and temporary tax cuts, tax 
aversion might prove to be temporary in this case, too. Another exception is that the taxation inducing 
tax aversion is certainly distortionary, and tax reduction would reduce tax burden considerably, making 
a decision to return back to formality easier. Finally, the policymaker might wish to deliberate about 
the possibility that “tax revenue may be greater under tax evasion than without evasion if evasive 
ability allows government to act as a price-discriminating monopolist” (Palda 1998, p. 1118). The 
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exploitation of such a possibility and persuasion rather than punishing means, the tax authority should 
be implementing to address the problem of tax compliance given that punishment is a lump-sum loss 
and does not modify incentives. 
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